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“NEW RULES FOR NEW WARS” INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUST WAR 
DOCTRINE FOR IRREGULAR WAR 
George R. Lucas, Jr.* 
This article traces the increasing pressures exerted upon interna-
tional law and international institutions from two sources: the humanitarian 
military interventions (and failures to intervene) in the aftermath of the 
Cold War during the decade of the 1990s; and the ―global war on terror‖ 
and wars of counterinsurgency and regime change fought during the first 
decade of the 21st century. Proposals for legal and institutional reform in 
response to these challenges emerge from two distinct and largely indepen-
dent sources: a ―publicist‖ or theoretical discussion among scholars in 
philosophy, law, and international relations; and a formal or procedural 
discussion among diplomats and statesmen, both focusing upon what the 
latter group defines as a ―responsibility to protect‖ (R2P). This study con-
cludes with recommendations for reform of international humanitarian law 
(or Law of Armed Conflict), and for reformulations of professional ethics 
and professional military education in allied militaries, both of which will 
be required to fully address the new challenges of ―irregular‖ or hybrid 
war. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The new era of ―irregular warfare‖ (IW) is thought to consist pri-
marily of the substantial changes and challenges in military tactics and mili-
  
 *   Professor of Ethics and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Califor-
nia and Class of 1984 Distinguished Chair of Ethics, United States Naval Academy, Annapo-
lis, Maryland. 
File: Lucas 2 Created on:  4/17/2011 7:03:00 PM Last Printed: 5/22/2011 7:45:00 PM 
678 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. [Vol. 43 
 
tary technology—the so-called ―revolution in military affairs‖ (RMA).1 On 
the one hand, asymmetric warfare, including a variety of types of terrorist 
attacks involving rudimentary technology, has largely replaced the massive 
confrontations between opposing uniformed combat troops employing high-
tech and heavy-platform weaponry that previously characterized conven-
tional war.2 On the other, new kinds of ―emerging technologies,‖ including 
military robotics and unmanned weapons platforms, non-lethal weapons, 
and cyber-attacks, ever-increasingly constitute the tactical countermeasures 
adopted by established nations in response.3 
The era of irregular or unconventional war also, however, requires 
another revolution—a cultural sea-change that has been much harder to 
identify, and much slower in coming. This radical cultural shift entails re-
conceptualizing the nature and purpose of war-fighting, and of the war-
fighter. This relatively neglected dimension of RMA requires new thinking 
about the role of military force in international relations, as well as about 
how nations raise, equip, train, and, most especially, about the ends for 
which these nations ultimately deploy their military forces. The new era of 
IW requires that military personnel develop a radically altered vision of 
their own roles as warriors and peacekeepers, as well as appropriate recog-
nition of the new demands IW imposes upon the requisite expertise, know-
ledge, and limits of acceptable conduct for members of the profession of 
arms. Finally, the new era of IW requires that those institutions and person-
nel who educate and train future warriors be much more effective in helping 
them understand and come to terms with their new identity, the new roles 
they will be expected to play in the international arena, and the new canons 
of professional conduct appropriate to those roles. 
This essay traces two parallel and independent discussions of the 
nature of this cultural transformation. The first, which I have attempted to 
document over the past two decades, consists in the discussion among phi-
losophers, ethicists, political theorists, and international relations scholars 
concerning the evolution of ―just war‖ doctrine.4 These discussions exhibit 
  
 1 See Prologue to ROBBIN F. LAIRD & HOLGER H. MEY, THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY 
AFFAIRS: ALLIED PERSPECTIVES 1 (1999). 
 2 See id. 
 3 See id. 
 4 See George R. Lucas, Jr., The Reluctant Interventionist: The Critique of Realism and the 
Resurgence of Morality in Foreign Policy in GEORGE R. LUCAS, JR., PERSPECTIVES ON 
HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION (Univ. of California Institute of Governmental 
Studies/Public Policy Press 2001); George R. Lucas, Jr., The Role of the International Com-
munity in the Just War Tradition: Confronting the Challenges of Humanitarian Intervention 
and Preemptive War, 2 JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS 122–144 (2003); George R. Lucas, Jr., 
From Jus ad bellum to Jus ad pacem: Rethinking Just War Criteria for the Use of Military 
Force for Humanitarian Ends , 72–96 in ETHICS AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION, Eds. Donald 
Scheid and Deen K. Chatterjee (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004); George R. Lucas, 
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what might be termed ―theoretical authority,‖ as contrasted with the ―for-
mal‖ or procedural authority inherent in a second, distinct discussion among 
diplomats and statesmen regarding the need for a more robust understanding 
of the role of military force in international affairs. In the aftermath of 
Rwanda and Kosovo in particular, this second, distinct category of delibera-
tion reflected a widely held conviction that, though the international com-
munity had not done nearly enough in Rwanda, we might well have done as 
much harm as good in Kosovo.5 
II. FIN DE SIÈCLE: A RETROSPECTIVE RECENT HISTORY OF JUST WAR 
Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, during what was 
heralded as the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, it became increa-
singly clear to many of those working in military ethics, international law, 
and just war doctrine that conventional thinking about the ways in which 
national military forces were trained and deployed had to be radically re-
conceived.6 The impetus for this re-conceptualization came from many 
quarters, some more well-grounded (in hindsight) than others. The era of 
superpower nuclear rivalry seemed at an end, and the era of conventional 
nation-state conflict diminished in importance. Especially in the aftermath 
of the short and decisive first Gulf War in 1991, it appeared increasingly 
unlikely that any ―rogue nation‖ would again undertake large-scale conven-
tional military aggression against a neighbor without fear of an overwhelm-
ing response by the international community collectively.7 
Sadly, the euphoria of what was then triumphantly described by 
U.S. President George H.W. Bush as the emergence of a ―new world or-
  
Jr., Jus in bello for Nonconventional Wars, Delivered at the International Studies Association 
49th Annual Meeting (Mar. 26, 2008), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_ 
apa_research_citation/2/5/3/5/9/p253594_index.html; George R. Lucas, Jr., ―Methodological 
Anarchy:‖ Arguing about Preventive War 33–56 in EMPOWERING OUR MILITARY 
CONSCIENCE: TRANSFORMING JUST WAR THEORY AND MILITARY MORAL EDUCATION (Ed. 
Roger Wertheimer London Ashgate Press 2010). 
 5 Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001), available at 
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf; Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty: Breaking New Ground, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119, 119 
(2001); Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Gareth Evans, A 
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).  
 6 Mary Caprioli & Peter F. Trumbore, Rhetoric Versus Reality: Rogue States in Interstate 
Conflict, 45 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 770, 770 (2005), available at 
http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-358-2010-S1_SWP/Syllabus/EReadings/ 
13.1.Rogues_CaprioliTrumbore2005Rhetoric.pdf. 
 7 Id. at 776. 
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der,‖8 was supplanted by the growing recognition that the new order con-
sisted largely of a new era of conflict, one that more typically involved the 
sorts of actions that militaries had hitherto undertaken only rarely and reluc-
tantly. Instead of a stable world order, with violent conflict deterred by the 
collectivity of nations committed to an orderly rule of law, we had instead 
entered the era of asymmetric war, humanitarian intervention, peace-
keeping, and stability operations—the sorts of conflicts that, at the time, 
were grouped variously under headings like ―police actions‖ or MOOTW 
(―military operations other than war‖).9  
The varied, improvised, highly inconsistent, and inchoate expe-
riences of military interventions for humanitarian or law enforcement and 
peacekeeping purposes in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, East Timor, and, towards 
the end of that decade, Kosovo, contributed to this realization. Even more 
telling, however, was the dramatic failure of humanitarian military interven-
tion by the United Nations (U.N.) in Rwanda.  
The questions centered no longer on legal or moral permissions or 
the legal license to carry out conventional military campaigns of the sort 
that current international law pertaining to self-defense and collective secu-
rity exclusively addresses. Instead, the even more troubling question in 
these new cases was, when should member-nations in the so-called ―interna-
tional community‖ recognize an obligation to come to the aid of vulnerable 
  
 8 Maj. Bart R. Kessler, Bush‘s New World Order: The Meaning Behind the Words 1 
(Mar. 1997) (unpublished research paper, Air Command and Staff College), available at 
www.oldthinkernews.com/.../Bushs-New-World-Order-The-Meaning-Behind-the-
Words.pdf.  
 9 U.S. Dept. of Def., Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JCO) 1–10 (Sept. 
11, 2007), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/iw_joc.pdf. The Depart-
ment of Defense‘s designation has since been replaced by a somewhat more refined, tripartite 
distinction between ―irregular‖ warfare (IW), major combat operations (MCO), and SSTRO: 
―stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction operations‖ (such as humanitarian inter-
vention and disaster relief). IW itself is defined as ―A violent struggle among state and non-
state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and 
asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabili-
ties, in order to erode an adversary‘s power, influence, and will.‖ The most recent ―term of 
art‖ to describe the complex interplay between conventional and unconventional operations 
is ―hybrid‖ war. These distinctions are somewhat artificial and for the most part, poorly 
drawn and even more poorly described. The message, however, is clear: the U.S. and other 
allied and coalition governments will face criminal and terrorist attacks of unconventional 
sorts, employing a variety of tactics and weapons, aimed largely at civilian populations rather 
than enemy governments or their military forces, and aimed at creating insecurity among the 
populations that are destabilizing to their respective governments. The joint doctrine is aimed 
at defining and formulating strategic responses to a variety of such conflicts.; see also Jeffrey 
Hasler, Defining War, 24 SPECIAL WARFARE 12, 15–17 (Jan.-Feb. 2011) (defining ―Irregular 
Warfare‖ and ―Hybrid Warfare‖ while cautioning that ―[r]egular review and restatement of 
approved definitions and their descriptions are necessary as sources of doctrine‖ so that 
unofficial terms and theories like ―Hybrid Warfare‖ do not get used incorrectly). 
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nations or victimized populations?10 What sets of conditions or criteria 
would constitute, for example, not so much a ―just cause‖ for going to war, 
as an overriding obligation to come to the aid of vulnerable victims? And, 
upon whom would such an obligation fall?11 
The answers to such questions were far from clear then, and remain 
so even today. Especially after the Rwanda debacle, commentators invoked 
the image of the Kitty Genovese murder in New York City in the 1960s and 
wondered, by analogy, what sort of ―community‖ the international commu-
nity was, if its member-states consistently turned a blind and uncaring eye 
away from such tragic and seemingly avoidable cases of genocide.12 Profes-
sor Stanley Hoffman, Harvard University, first began discussing criteria for 
what he termed ―jus ad interventionem‖ in the mid-1990s.13 Hoffman ana-
logized to traditional jus ad bellum, in which he advocated primarily the 
legal right of individual nations and coalitions to intervene militarily, or 
otherwise override the prevailing legal principle of national sovereignty, in 
the face of massive abuses of human rights.14  
While his learned analysis of the pending collapse of the traditional 
nation-state system of sovereignty was respectable, Hoffman‘s response was 
not quite rightly put. Instead, my own term at the time was jus ad pacem, 
stressing the peace-restoring intentions of military intervention, and discuss-
ing not the right, but the obligation to undertake such missions, even if re-
luctantly, in defense of the most basic human rights of vulnerable peoples.15 
Subsequently, the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeline K. Albright, long under 
intense criticism for her unwillingness to recognize such an obligation dur-
ing the Rwandan genocide, began to argue for replacing the so-called 
Weinberger-Powell doctrine16 governing the resort to military force in 
  
 10 Gregory Reichberg & Henrik Syse, Humanitarian Intervention: A Case of Offensive 
Force?, 33 SECURITY DIALOGUE 309, Sept. 2002, at 309, 313–14. 
 11 I first highlighted this dilemma in 1998, in an essay entitled ―The Reluctant Interven-
tionist,‖ for a working group hosted by the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Af-
fairs, and subsequently delivered as a colloquium at a meeting of the American Philosophical 
Association on Wednesday March 24, 1999, just hours after NATO began its air campaign in 
Kosovo. Lucas, The Reluctant Interventionist, supra note 4; George R. Lucas, Ethical Issues 
in the Use of Military Force for Humanitarian Intervention, (Carnegie Council on Ethics and 
Int‘l Affairs and the Nat‘l War Coll., Keynote Discussion Paper for the Third Conference on 
Ethics and Warfare in the 21st Century, February 5–6, 1998).  
 12 Lucas, The Role of the International Community, supra note 4, at 122, 126–27. 
 13 See STANLEY HOFFMAN, THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
(Notre Dame University Press 1996). 
 14 Id. 
 15 See Lucas, The Reluctant Interventionist: The Critique of Realism and the Resurgence 
of Morality in Foreign Policy, supra note 4; Lucas, From Jus ad bellum to Jus ad pacem , 
supra note 4.  
 16 Also cited simply as the ―Weinberger Doctrine‖ after Secretary of State ―Cap‖ Wein-
berger, who first officially issued the guidance. The doctrine in fact reflects the collective 
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America, with what we briefly came to call the ―Albright Doctrine.‖17 
American military might, she asserted, would henceforth be at the disposal 
of the U.N. and the international community to aid desperate peoples and 
nations ravaged by state failure and genocide.18  
Simultaneously, the eminent just war theorist, Michael Walzer, ar-
gued in the preface to the third edition of Just and Unjust Wars that, on the 
one hand, while nothing concerning conventional war had changed suffi-
ciently to prompt the re-writing or supervening of that classic work, on the 
other hand, everything else pertaining to justifiable war had changed.19 In 
particular, he admitted that humanitarian military intervention—something 
viewed by him in that earlier work with some suspicion as a marginal mili-
tary concern, undertaken by traditional nation-states with decidedly mixed 
motives—now properly occupied center stage in the debate over just war 
doctrine at the dawn of the new millennium.20  
My own concern continued to be that these conversations all re-
mained focused upon permissions to intervene, or the presumed legal right 
to intervene or override national sovereignty for humanitarian purposes. 
This did not seem adequately to address, at the time, the dilemmas faced in 
Rwanda, Bosnia, or Kosovo, in which other nations appeared reluctant to 
take on what otherwise appeared a moral (if not a legal) obligation to come 
to the aid of vulnerable victims of state failure, or of state-sponsored ethnic 
oppression.21 There was a widespread and mistaken belief (then and now) 
  
thinking of Vietnam-era military veterans, including the eventual Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs and Secretary of State Colin Powell. The doctrine chiefly held that U.S. military 
forces should never again be committed to armed conflict without a clear and widely sup-
ported mandate from Congress and the American public, including clear objectives defining 
mission success and an ―exit strategy‖ to terminate hostilities, and the commitment of suffi-
cient troops and materiel to ensure overwhelming military superiority in pursuit of the mis-
sion. It is patently obvious that most IW conflicts of whatever sort during the past two dec-
ades failed to satisfy most of these criteria. See Excerpts from Address of Weinberger, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 29, 1984, at A5. 
 17 Madeleine K, Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, American Principle and Purpose, For-
restal Lecture, U.S. Naval Academy (Apr. 15, 1997) (transcript available at http://secretary. 
state.gov/www/statements/970415.html); Madeleine K, Albright, U.S. Secretary of State , 
The United States and Assistance to Post-Conflict Societies, USAID Conference on Democ-
racy, Human Rights, and Reintegration (Oct. 31, 1997) (transcript available at 
http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/971031.html); Madeleine K. Albright, Farewell 
Remarks, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State (Jan. 19, 2001) (transcript available at 
http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2001/ 
010119.html). 
 18 Id. 
 19 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS xi–xvi (3d ed. 2000). 
 20 Id. 
 21 See Raymond Bonner, The World; Begging for Mercy For Rwanda -- Earlier This Time, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1994, available at http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F4 
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that the U.N. Genocide Convention of 1948 specifically imposed such obli-
gations on U.N. member nations, or at least upon the Convention‘s signato-
ries or contracting parties.22 However, as became painfully obvious in more 
recent cases such as Darfur, that Convention most assuredly does not im-
pose any such obligations. 23 Accordingly, it gradually became apparent that 
attention needed to be focused more clearly on questions of formal or pro-
cedural authority at the international level for assigning or affixing respon-
sibility for jus ad pacem in terms of what the German Enlightenment philo-
sopher, Immanuel Kant, would term an ―imperfect duty,‖ rather than, as 
with Hoffman, merely a legal right or permission.24  
Even more, I worried that no one in that discussion at the time was 
focusing on the equally important question that I labeled jus in pace (in 
  
0C12FE39540C748EDDA80994DC494D81. 
 22 Karen Engle, ―Calling in the Troops‖: The Uneasy Relationship Among Women’s 
Rights, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Intervention, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 211 
(2007). 
 23 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 
78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html. The Convention 
offers a working definition of genocide, and binds its signatories and contracting parties not 
to engage in it or tolerate it within their borders, and to do all in their power to apprehend and 
bring to justice those individuals implicated in such acts. Only Article 8 addresses actions 
other than criminal prosecution of individual perpetrators, and it merely states that ―any 
Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such 
action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the preven-
tion and suppression of acts of genocide.‖ It does not compel signatories or contracting par-
ties to do this, nor does it specify what actions might be required of the United Nations or its 
member states in response, apart from the procedures for indictment, extradition, and crimi-
nal prosecution of perpetrators of genocide after the fact. The document was a product of its 
time, aimed at denouncing Nazi atrocities, and admonishing nations against harboring Nazi 
fugitives from justice. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that those, like Albright, who 
feared to invoke its provisions had not actually ever read them, and that many readers had 
merely imagined or extrapolated an idealistic, but wholly nonexistent responsibility of na-
tions to employ military force, if necessary, to halt or prevent genocide. The Darfur example 
decisively refutes this interpretation. For a concise summary of current understanding and 
status of this convention, see William A. Schabas, Convention on the Prevention and Pu-
nishment of the Crime of Genocide (2008), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/law/ 
iv-1.htm. 
 24 Perfect duties, or what Kant later called ―duties of justice,‖ are those in which specific 
actions (or restrictions on action) are defined for obligors as duties owed to specific obligees, 
while ―imperfect‖ duties, or ―duties of virtue,‖ describe categories of activities required of 
obligors, without defining either specific obligees, or specific actions owed them. The former 
category of moral duties are properly the subject of legislation within a legal system of jus-
tice (according to Kant), while the latter (e.g., the moral duty of philanthropy) cannot intel-
ligibly be legislated because of this lack of specificity of obligee and obligation that would 
normally constitute the content of such legislation. This distinction is first introduced in the 
second chapter of Kant‘s Grundlegung (1783), and later refined in his Rechtslehre, or ―Doc-
trine of Justice‖ (1795). See, e.g., EMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gre-
gor, trans., Cambridge University Press, 1996) (1797). 
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analogy with jus in bello) concerning the constraints imposed on the moti-
vations and conduct of those charged with use of deadly force during such 
campaigns. The chief difference, I argued, was that armed combatants in 
these new kinds of irregular or unconventional conflict did not face an ene-
my in the conventional sense, towards (or more properly, between) whom 
the customary law of armed conflict and relevant Geneva conventions com-
prising the bright-line statutes of international humanitarian law applied 
(affording protection to non-combatants, prisoners, and relief workers).25 
Instead, they functioned as a kind of international constabulary, charged 
with keeping order, making peace, providing security, and attempting to re-
establish and maintain the Rule of Law in situations in which the normal 
order had broken down.26 ―War‖ in the twenty-first century had come to 
resemble less the invasion of Normandy, or Japan, or even of Kuwait, than 
it now resembled the activities of police and national guardsmen during a 
domestic riot, or similar situations in which domestic security forces are 
mobilized to counter a criminal conspiracy, gang violence, or to maintain 
order and provide relief during natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurri-
canes, tsunamis, or famine. The sudden elevation of such activities from 
occasional and marginal status to the principle justification for the use of 
military force in the international arena, however, required a radical re-
thinking of conventional military preparation and education, as well as of 
the relevant rules of engagement governing combat and occupation. 
This claim was not well received at the time. In Afghanistan, it is 
not well received even now. Many colleagues in international relations 
countered in effect that ―war is war,‖ and that the same rules still governed 
the conduct of soldiers and protection of noncombatants in these humanita-
rian and peacekeeping operations as had governed, for example, their beha-
vior toward German and Japanese soldiers and civilians during World War 
II.27  
That conviction, however, seemed relatively easy to refute. There 
are sharp differences between conventional military operations and consta-
bulary operations, even as vaguely defined at the international level, mostly 
involving risk, force protection, and the economical (or proportional) use of 
force. As one example, wholly unlike the rules of engagement during con-
ventional combat, military troops engaged in constabulary operations, or 
otherwise providing security as part of an occupying military force, are only 
  
 25 See, e.g., U.S. ARMY, FM 3-0, OPERATIONS vii (2008) available at http://www. 
army.mil/fm3-0/FM3-0.pdf (―Army doctrine now equally weights tasks dealing with the 
population—stability or civil support—with those related to offensive and defensive opera-
tions.‖). 
 26 Id. 
 27 See, e.g., Cian O‘Driscoll, New Thinking in the Just War Tradition: Theorizing the War 
on Terror, in SECURITY AND THE WAR ON TERROR (Alex J. Bellamy, et al. eds., 2007). 
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permitted to use lethal force in cases of individual self-defense, and only as 
a last resort.28  
It has been a vindication of sorts to have those important differences 
between combat and police work subsequently recognized and affirmed as 
official doctrine, almost a decade later, in the current U.S. Army field ma-
nual on ―counterinsurgency operations‖ or COIN.29 As that manual itself 
now clarifies, the moral calculus in these areas changes substantially in a 
manner that frequently imparts more risk and responsibility for discrimina-
tion, proportionality, and non-injury to combatants, similar to the rules of 
engagement governing the use of force by domestic police.30 As the interest-
ing ―7th Chapter‖ on ―Leadership and Ethics during Counterinsurgency‖ 
makes clear, these restrictions are imposed equally on moral and legal, as 
well as prudential grounds.31 Overall, this inescapable equivocation between 
roles, and the incumbent responsibility the manual demands to know both 
which role is which, and (even more importantly) what role the individual 
combatant is fulfilling at any given moment, has become the chief characte-
ristic of IW. 
At the time, a decade ago, my senior military colleagues were even 
more outraged at this suggestion. ―We are not police, and ought not to un-
dertake constabulary duties,‖ several fumed. ―We are the ‗pointy end‘ of the 
spear! When normal order disappears, we are warriors who kill people and 
break things until someone tells us to stop.‖32  
―No,‖ I would reply. ―It is now criminal conspirators, terrorists, and 
lawless gangs of genocidal vigilantes who are killing people and breaking 
things (or, most recently, engaging in piracy on the high seas). In this new 
era of warfare, you are the warriors who intervene forcefully to protect the 
  
 28 See U.S. ARMY, supra note 25, at vii.  
 29 See HEADQUARTERS DEPT. OF THE ARMY, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 
COUNTERINSURGENCY, vii (2006) (―This field manual/Marine Corps warfighting publication 
established doctrine . . . for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environ-
ment.‖), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/FM_3-24.pdf. 
 30 See id. at Foreword. 
 31 See id. at 7-1. 
 32 One routinely hears general characterizations of one‘s proper role such as this from 
military personnel. In this instance, however, I refer to principled disagreements I had be-
tween 1997 and 2005 with my counterparts in the Chair of Leadership at the Naval Acade-
my: Admirals Leon A. ―Bud‖ Edney, Henry ―Hank‖ Chiles, and Vice Admiral Michael 
Haskins. All three were highly experienced and accomplished retired Navy flag officers. Bud 
Edney flew combat air missions over North Vietnam in Squadron VA-164 and had over 
1,000 carrier landings in his career. Hank Chiles was a nuclear submariner, experienced on 
the front lines of the ―Cold War‖ as former CO of ―STRATCOM,‖ America‘s strategic nuc-
lear forces. Mike Haskins had completed his career as the Inspector General of the Navy, 
and, together with Admiral James Ellis, made all the final targeting decisions during the 
Kosovo air campaign. 
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intended victims, and who, with that same point of your spear, order those 
perpetrators of violence to stop.‖ First and foremost, that is to say, warriors 
during IW provide protection and security for intended victims until their 
criminal oppressors are forced to desist.33 That, I submit, constitutes an 
enormous departure from the warrior‘s role during conventional combat, 
and it has proved extremely challenging for contemporary military person-
nel to understand and adapt to this radically altered role. This constitutes the 
principal challenge in Afghanistan at present. 
III. THE RISE OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR (GWOT) 
Such was the state of the debate as of the Year 2001. It was an in-
choate conversation, a kind of intellectual or methodological anarchy that is 
historically inherent in the publicist tradition of international law and inter-
national norms generally. No one is ―in charge‖ of this conversation. In-
stead, in the absence of any clear-cut chain of command or ―ecclesiastical 
authority,‖ various individuals and communities opine, editorialize, lament, 
and propose without any clear hierarchy or structure of authority, or any 
systematic way of vetting their proposals. No organization or international 
body licensed or commissioned studies of these matters, and the extent to 
which anyone paid attention to the proposals I have cited in the literature 
and conversation of the time was largely a function of the prominence or 
visibility of their authors, rather than the merit of the proposals themselves. 
Recognizing this problem, my own efforts at the time were to gather and 
systematize these various discrete proposals and contributions with full at-
tribution, in hopes of provoking a more reflective conversation about where 
we stood, and what problems (such as generating appropriate jus in bello 
constraints for irregular warfare) still needed to be more carefully ad-
dressed. 
Meanwhile, concurrent with the aforementioned events in the 
1990s, two decades of seemingly random and scattered terrorist attacks 
aimed increasingly at the United States and its citizens directly, came to a 
head in the coordinated suicide air attacks on the Trade Towers in New 
York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Like genocide and humanita-
  
 33 This was the position taught and advocated in leadership and ethics programs at the U.S. 
Naval Academy. It is consistent with the view of contemporary warriors. See MICHAEL 
IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR‘S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND THE MODERN CONSCIENCE 5–7 (1998) 
(discussing moral connections many Westerners feel for the rest of the world, the impact it 
has on ethnic accommodation in their own countries, and how countries heal after war and 
savagery); see also SHANNON E. FRENCH, THE CODE OF THE WARRIOR: EXPLORING WARRIOR 
VALUES PAST AND PRESENT 7 (1st paperback ed. 2003) (―By setting a standard of behavior 
for themselves, accepting certain restraints, and even ―honoring their enemies,‖ warriors can 
create a life-line that will allow them to pull themselves out of the hell of war and reintegrate 
themselves into their society.‖). 
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rian disasters, these acts signaled the dramatic weakening and the increasing 
irrelevance of the traditional nation-state system, and along with it the legal 
norms of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The existing system of 
international law, organized specifically around the ―legalist‖ or ―Westpha-
lian‖ paradigm, addressed the governance of states as collective entities 
treated under law like biological individuals.34 This conceptual framework 
seemed pathetically unsuited to the task of discerning the appropriate re-
sponse to ―non-state actors‖ engaged in coordinated and large-scale acts of 
violence aimed indiscriminately at random citizens, even as that same body 
of law had failed miserably to confront the earlier dilemma of governments 
that turned violently against their own citizens.35 
Into this legal and moral void, unfortunately, strode neoconserva-
tive advocates of a ―new American realism,‖ with relatively little experience 
in foreign relations and a decidedly contemptuous attitude for international 
law and international institutions generally.36 They invoked these crises as 
occasions for promulgating doctrines of unrelenting vigilantism and unilate-
ralism. They proposed to meet force with force, fight fire with fire, and un-
wittingly and unreflectively in the process, to stoop to the level of criminals 
and terrorists in order to combat them. The U.N. and other institutions of 
international law were ridiculed, by Richard Perle in particular, for their 
unfortunate tendencies toward ineffectiveness and corruption. Both of these 
admittedly undeniable tendencies appeared to ground the assertions of the 
―new realists‖ that these corrupt and ineffective international organizations 
  
 34 See John Davenport, Just War Theory, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Need for a 
Democratic Federation, FORDHAM UNIV. 36–37, http://www.fordham.edu/philosophy/ 
davenport/texts/globalfed-justwar.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2011) (discussing the concept 
that state sovereignty should be conceived as ―derivative from recognizing ‗socially basic 
rights‘ and providing (to some significant degree) the goods to which they entitle individual 
citizens: for government [rights] are. . .derived from the rights of the people‖). 
 35 As writers like Martin L. Cook and Henry Shue complained, the underlying conceptions 
of sovereignty and territorial integrity seemed, in the latter instances at least, unintentionally 
to grant the legal right to commit unlimited wrongs with the legally secure jurisdiction of 
one‘s own borders. As Cook remarked at the time, this seemed a steep moral price to pay for 
collective security. See MARTIN L. COOK, THE MORAL WARRIOR: ETHICS AND SERVICE IN THE 
U.S. MILITARY (2004); Henry Shue, Limiting Sovereignty, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 11, 12 (Jennifer M. Welsh ed., 2004); MARTIN L. COOK, 
UNCHARTED WATERS, 7th Annual Stutt Lecture, U.S. Naval Academy (Feb. 23, 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.usna.edu/ethics/Publications/CookPg1-24_Final.pdf. 
 36 Including former Vice President Richard Cheney, national security adviser Richard 
Perle, deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Secretary of State Condelezza Rice, and a 
number of prominent neoconservative political theorists (including both William and Irving 
Christol), collectively known as ―neocons‖ or derided by their critics as ―chicken hawks.‖ 
See Cheyney Ryan‘s recent assessment. CHEYNEY RYAN, THE CHICKENHAWK SYNDROME: 
WAR , SACRIFICE, AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1–2 (2009). 
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and legal institutions could justifiably be ignored or overridden.37 Commen-
tators wondered whether the traditional distinction between combatants and 
noncombatants during asymmetric conflict was any longer sustainable, and 
whether maintaining a respect for the lives of bystanders merely disadvan-
taged the ―law-abiding‖ side in these new conflicts.38 Others wondered 
whether otherwise rights-respecting states or their representatives should 
now be authorized to engage in torture, or enhanced interrogation of unin-
dicted suspects in these conflicts, or whether they were entitled to appre-
hend and detain (as well as interrogate) these suspects in ways that utterly 
flaunted existing domestic values, and represented clear and intentional 
violations of existing provisions of international law.39 
That such pernicious doctrines could gain what turned out to be a 
devastating foothold in this country and abroad I finally attribute in part to 
the understandable confusion, fear, and anger that accompanied the se-
quence of events narrated above. But, it also reflected the fact that what 
might otherwise have constituted sober voices in this international conversa-
tion were ―AWOL.‖ While political scientists and scholars in international 
relations continued to debate the evolution of just war doctrine, largely in its 
conventional mode,40 philosophers and ethicists had allowed their own par-
ticipation in these ongoing conversations to lapse almost to silence in the 
aftermath of the Vietnam War. Legal scholars, for their part, remained 
blindly, almost pathologically wedded to their increasingly outmoded West-
phalian paradigm, stubbornly invoking the bright-line provisions of interna-
tional law to rail against the improvised, case-based responses of nations 
and their military forces as those forces, in turn, tried vainly to cope with 
these largely-unfamiliar problems.41 Few were willing to admit that these 
crises presented problems which those laws and legal institutions them-
selves were poorly equipped to address. 
  
 37 Lucas, The Role of the International Community, supra note 4; Lucas, Methodological 
Anarchy: Arguing about Preventive War, supra note 4. 
 38 See MICHAEL L. GROSS, MORAL DILEMMAS OF MODERN WAR: TORTURE, 
ASSASSINATION, AND BLACKMAIL IN AN AGE OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT (2010); Jeffrey Rei-
man, Ethics for Calamities: How Strict is the Moral Rule Against Targeting Non-
combatants? 93–106, in EMPOWERING OUR MILITARY CONSCIENCE: TRANSFORMING JUST 
WAR THEORY AND MILITARY MORAL EDUCATION (Roger Wertheimer ed., 2010). 
 39 See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, 
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 162–63 (2002). 
 40 See generally Richard Falk, Legality to Legitimacy: The Revival of the Just War 
Framework, HARV. INT‘L REV. (May 6, 2006), http://hir.harvard.edu/interventionism/legality-
to-legitimacy?page=0,2; Michael Walzer, The triumph of just war theory—and the dangers 
of success, SOCIAL RESEARCH (2002), http://rci.rutgers.edu/~tripmcc/phil/walzer-triumphof 
justwartheory.pdf. 
 41 See generally John Dugard, International Terrorism and the Just War, 12 STAN. J. INT‘L 
STUD. 21 (1977); Ruti Teitel, The Wages of Just War, 39 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 689 (2006). 
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The challenge we now face as a result of these decidedly unfortu-
nate developments is a stark and unpalatable choice between two alterna-
tives. We may choose to adhere, on the one hand, to increasingly outmoded 
institutions and principles grounded in the ―legalist paradigm‖ or otherwise 
in the priority of sovereignty in the Westphalian system of nation-states, and 
cling stubbornly to the increasingly irrelevant structural deficiencies of the 
U.N. itself. The alternative, on the other hand, requires abandoning all these 
underlying conceptions and international institutions based upon them, and 
instead allowing this recent ―perfect storm‖ of tragic events, from Rwanda 
to Iraq, to persuade us (as the ―chicken hawks‖ propose) that there are no 
longer any ―rules‖ governing conflict, and that each side or participant is 
licensed to do whatever it takes to prevail in pursuit of their narrow inter-
ests. 
IV. THE NEW RULES FOR NEW WARS 
Perhaps we should instead phrase the problem as a question. If the 
old rules, paradigms, and institutions are no longer adequate to ground our 
understanding and situate our responses to these new developments, what 
(other than ―nothing‖) should take their place? What, for example, should 
be the rules governing entry into, and military conduct during, these new 
sorts of conflicts? When, how, and upon whom are obligations to intervene 
in the interests of the lives and welfare of vulnerable peoples to be imposed? 
How in particular should we address the criticisms of realists and ―vigi-
lantes‖ who claim that they are not bound by rules or conventions of any 
sort, and should be free to protect their citizens‘ lives and properties wholly 
as they see fit, by whatever means are deemed ―necessary?‖42  
It is first incumbent to ask whether the discussions of the limited 
justification for such resort to force can be meaningfully made simply by 
appeal to traditional just war criteria. As stated, the proposed military opera-
tions, whether aimed at counter-terrorism, stability and peacekeeping or 
humanitarian intervention, are not ―war‖ in the conventional sense. Ought 
we, therefore, in evaluating the justifications for such operations, to appeal 
solely to criteria designed to evaluate the moral justification of conventional 
  
 42 To date, as I stated in the introduction to this paper, there have been two substantive 
answers: the collective set of guidelines emerging from what might be termed scholarly 
debate and analysis during the 1990s, to which I referred above (and which are re-printed in 
Table 1), and the work of international diplomats during the period 2000–2005, under the 
aegis of the Canadian government and the United Nations, addressed primarily to the dilem-
ma of intervention to protect the peoples of failed states like Rwanda from harm. This work, 
originally undertaken by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(2001) has come to be known as ―The Responsibility to Protect‖ (R2P). See INTERNATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, http://www.iciss.ca/menu-en.asp 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2011). 
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war?43 During the decade of post Cold War humanitarian interventions in 
the 1990s, for example, this question remained unformulated, but it can be 
seen in hindsight to have driven much of the discussion. Alternative criteria, 
proposed piecemeal by Michael Walzer, Stanley Hoffman, David Luban, 
and others began to emerge in order to adjudicate disputes concerning the 
moral legitimacy of military interventions in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Haiti, and Kosovo—interventions that frequently seemed to invoke moral 
obligations on the part of the ―international community‖ that appeared 
sharply at variance with ―bright-line‖ provisions of international law.44 In 
2001, I began to offer and promote a collective summary of those alterna-
tive jus ad pacem criteria emerging from a variety of voices and discussions 
that continued throughout the debate on preemptive self-defense in 2002–
2003.45  
Subsequently, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissioned a 
report from a ―High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,‖ de-
  
 43 As an illustration of the trouble one can generate: the three divisions of the American 
Philosophical Association, for example, considered a resolution opposing the proposed 
American-led intervention in Iraq, which offered as its chief justification for such opposition 
the claim that: ―Both [JWT] and international law say that states may resort to war only in 
self-defense.‖ American Philosophical Association Resolution: Philosophers Vote Over-
whelmingly Against the War, Feb. 2003, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY, available at 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/peaceforum/apa.html. Neither, of course, says any such thing 
without considerable ambiguity, though this is a fair (if imprecise) summary of what might 
be termed the ―historical vector‖ of JWT away from ambiguous moral discourse and toward 
the specificity and clarity afforded by the legalist paradigm, in which only self defense 
against aggression constitutes a justification for war. This resolution as stated initially was 
passed in the Eastern division by a margin of nearly five-to-one, notwithstanding its histori-
cal and factual inaccuracies. The Pacific division, by contrast, passed a modified resolution 
expressing ―serious doubts about the morality, legality and prudence of a war against Iraq led 
by the United States,‖ on somewhat less than a three-to-one majority, only after deleting as 
inaccurate the characterization of just war doctrine and international law contained in the 
earlier draft. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 77 AM. 
PHILOSOPHICAL ASS‘N 2 (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3219744. (The 
Central Division wisely deferred the motion, on the grounds that its substance exceeded the 
range of their collective expertise). 
 44 See Ragvi Mahalingam, The Compatibility of the Principal of Nonintervention with the 
Right of Humanitarian Intervention, 1 UCLA J. INT‘L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 221 (1996), see 
also Saira Mohamed, Restructuring the Debate on Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention, 
88 N.C. L. REV. 1278 (2010), available at http://nclawreview.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/ 
05/Mohamed.wptd_.pdf. 
 45 See Appendix; see also LUCAS, PERSPECTIVES ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra 
note 4; see also GEORGE R. LUCAS, JR. & WILLIAM RUBEL, ETHICS & THE MILITARY 
PROFESSION: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF LEADERSHIP (Pearson, 2004; 3rd ed. 2010) (The 
table included in the appendix to this article is widely studied by future military officers in 
the United States). 
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signed to re-think the ideal of collective security in the U.N. Charter.46 Led 
by Gareth Evans, president of the International Crisis Group in Brussels and 
former minister for foreign affairs of Australia, the High-level Panel issued 
five basic guidelines, in the form of questions for the U.N. Security Council 
to consider, when deciding whether to authorize the use of military force: 
 
(a) Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human security 
of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use 
of military force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide 
and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended? 
(b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed 
military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other 
purposes or motives may be involved? 
(c) Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in 
question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other 
measures will not succeed? 
(d) Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the pro-
posed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in ques-
tion? 
(e) Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the military 
action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the conse-




More detail and guidance, concerning ―R2P‖ specifically, is offered 
in the original report of the ―International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty‖ (ICISS), still largely organized (as are the above criteria) 
along the lines of traditional ―just war‖ doctrine.48 The initial report of the 
Commission in 2001, in the wake of 9/11, drew a distinction between the 
responsibilities of nations to protect their own citizens (e.g., the then-
pending United States response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks), and the respon-
sibilities incumbent upon states confronting what the report termed ―human 
  
 46 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL‘S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES, 
AND CHANGE: A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY (New York: United 
Nations, 2004). 
 47 Id. at para. 207; see also ALEX BELLAMY, A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT THE GLOBAL 
EFFORT TO END MASS ATROCITIES (Griffith University 2009). 
 48 See REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (International Development Research Centre 
2001). 
File: Lucas 2 Created on:  4/17/2011 7:03:00 PM Last Printed: 5/22/2011 7:45:00 PM 
692 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. [Vol. 43 
 
protection claims in other states.‖49 That report, in turn, conceived of the 
underlying question entirely, as did Stanley Hoffman and others at the time, 
in terms of the ―rights‖ of states to intervene in other states, and the contro-
versy this engendered regarding state sovereignty.50 However, under the 
heading of ―operational principles,‖ it did engage the issue of the duties of 
caution and restraint incurred by the intervening militaries.51  
In such a conceptual framework, humanitarian intervention and 
―R2P‖ does seem to be a concern that is quite distinct from counter-
terrorism, COIN, and so-called preventive war, not to mention retaliation of 
the sort subsequently inflicted by the United States and NATO allies upon 
the Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan. The International Con-
vention on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) understood itself to 
be addressing only the ―right of humanitarian intervention,‖ and held that 
the remaining issues were, according to the Commission, ―already well ad-
dressed‖ by prevailing international law and U.N. Security Council proce-
dures.52 With the benefit of hindsight, however, there are grounds for ques-
tioning the rigidity of those distinctions, and especially for questioning the 
adequacy of international law or institutions to handle any of them.  
Our actual experience with such conflicts has taught, in contrast, 
that the nature of the conflicts themselves tend to defy and defeat any tidy 
conceptual distinctions we try to impose upon them. About the only distinc-
tion that survives experience with these conflicts is, once again, the ac-
knowledgement that whatever these military actions are, they do not com-
prise conventional war in any meaningful sense, as the ICISS report itself 
explicitly acknowledges in its concluding sections on ―Operational Dimen-
sions,‖53 and have radically different objectives than either traditional war-
fighting or traditional peace-keeping on the older U.N. model. In particular, 
any military operation will need to demonstrate in all cases going forward 
what Rwanda especially required: the ability and willingness to engage in 
much more robust action than traditional peacekeeping, as currently envi-
sioned under prevailing U.N. guidelines.54 This is especially problematic for 
  
 49 INT‘L COMM‘N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT: REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY viii (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf. 
 50 Id. at 8. 
 51 Id. at xiii. 
 52 See id. at vii–viii. 
 53 Id. at 57. 
 54 INT‘L COMM‘N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 49, at 57 (2001). 
The later, and broader, U.N. High-Level Panel report put this matter succinctly in its execu-
tive summary:  
Long-established customary international law makes it clear that States can take 
military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would 
 
File: Lucas 2 Created on: 4/17/2011 7:03:00 PM Last Printed: 5/22/2011 7:45:00 PM 
2011] NEW RULES FOR NEW WARS 693 
 
the U.N., because, as the 2001 report acknowledges, the U.N. does not wage 
(or traditionally to this point, has not waged) war, and lacks the kind of ―lo-
gistic planning and support, and command and control capacity, that would 
make possible either war-fighting or military interventions of any signifi-
cant size.‖55 I would add a final caveat: that the approach taken by the 
Commission itself, in focusing on a right or legal permission to override 
sovereignty, failed in the end to fully engage the difficulty inherent in R2P 
itself: once again, the obligation or duty (rather than some sort of ―right‖) to 
intervene in the face of an impending or ongoing humanitarian crisis. 
Military commanders, for their part, likewise have now come to 
recognize that the real underlying issue is simply that IW/HI/COIN do not 
constitute ―war‖ in any conventional meaning of the term. This is so, 
whether the ―wars‖ in question are wars fought in response to provocation 
(as the U.N.-authorized, NATO-led war in Afghanistan that began in No-
vember, 2001), or intended instead either to prevent, or halt the progress of 
a humanitarian disaster in a failed state, or whether the war in question is a 
preventive war of counter-terrorism and regime change (as in Iraq). What-
ever the view of the justification, advisability, or feasibility of such wars, 
they are definitely not ―conventional.‖  
Consider that in all the instances cited above, military operations re-
sembling conventional war—for instance, the sort of conflict described and 
analyzed by Clausewitz, or illustrated by wars from WW I and II through 
Korea—were concluded in a very short period.56 For example, Taliban 
forces were unseated from governance in Kabul and, along with al-Qaeda 
operatives, driven out of the country or into hiding in Pakistan, while Sad-
  
deflect it, and the action is proportionate. The Security Council has the authority to 
act preventively, but has rarely done so. The Security Council may well need to be 
prepared to be more proactive in the future, taking decisive action earlier. States 
that fear the emergence of distant threats have an obligation to bring these concerns 
to the Security Council. 
REP. OF THE U.N. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE, A MORE 
SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) 4 (2004), available at 
http://www.un.org/secureworld/brochure.pdf. While implicitly a rebuke to the U.S. for wag-
ing unilateral or vigilante preventive war, the statement acknowledges the importance of 
considering this option at some level as an appropriate response to international criminal 
conspiracy or a pending humanitarian crisis. Taken in context, moreover, the issue is treated 
as part and parcel of a comprehensive approach toward international law and order that in-
corporates preventive war, counter-terrorism, and law enforcement with humanitarian inter-
vention, peace-keeping, and stability operations. Id. 
 55 INT‘L COMM‘N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 49. At the time 
of this writing, the U.N.‘s attempt to respond to the rebellion and retaliation in Libya are 
providing a dramatic test of the structural limitations described in the report. 
 56 Joseph J. Collins, Planning Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq, 41 JOINT FORCES 
QUARTERLY, June 2006, at 10 (noting the difference between conventional warfare and the 
asymmetric wars in Afghanistan and Iraq). 
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dam Hussein‘s army was largely routed and dispersed, and Hussein himself 
driven from power and into hiding, all in a matter of weeks.57 Conventional 
military operations (attacks against a conventional enemy, employing con-
ventional weapons and tactics) were quickly replaced by the same kind of 
humanitarian peacekeeping and stability operations undertaken variously in 
Bosnia, East Timor, and Kosovo, or unsuccessfully in Rwanda.58 These are 
precisely the operations (illustrated precisely, in turn, by the case studies) 
featured in the Army COIN field manual: the challenges of a military occu-
pation, pacification of the countryside, re-building of the basic infrastruc-
tures of civil society, providing personal and community security through 
effective police work, re-establishing the rule of law, and basically building 
trust through other kinds of effective public relations with the local popula-
tion of the occupied territory (the clichéd, but no less important, ―winning 
hearts and minds‖).59 They also, in both instances, resulted in an insurgency, 
or, more properly, the rise of a number of distinct insurgent groups, opposed 
to the occupation and determined at very least to impede or prevent success 
in the IW operations described and hoping eventually to wrest power from 
the occupation or from the resulting provisional governments the occupation 
supported.60 
Counterinsurgency and humanitarian military interventions both 
have this property: that they are not, strictly speaking, war at all, but some-
thing more akin to domestic constabulary operations carried out by a non-
constabulary force—sometimes, as in Iraq, comprised technically of ―vigi-
lantes‖61—operating somewhat ad hoc in the international arena. There has 
been a good deal of discussion since 2003 of the justifiability of preventive 
wars of intervention, a sub-category of what medieval and early modern 
  
 57 Id. 
 58 See generally INST. FOR NAT‘L STRATEGIC STUDIES, GLOBAL STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT: 
AMERICA‘S SECURITY ROLE IN A CHANGING WORLD 145–61 (2009) (describing the humanita-
rian interests involved after the close of conventional warfare). 
 59 See generally, U.S. ARMY & MARINE CORPS, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, 
Forward (2006) http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf (―A counterinsurgency cam-
paign is, as described in this manual, a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations 
conducted along multiple lines of operations.‖). 
 60 Id. 
 61 This is my terminology, introduced originally in a NEH-sponsored ―Summer Institute 
on War and Morality‖ that I co-directed with Dr. Albert Pierce in 2004. Lucas, Methodologi-
cal Anarchy, supra note 4, at 33 (Roger Wertheimer ed., 2010). The term is employed effec-
tively by one of the participants in that institute, Prof. Jordy Rocheleau, in Preventive War 
and Lawful Constraints on the Use of Force: An Argument against International Vigilantism, 
198–202, in RE-THINKING THE JUST WAR TRADITION (Eds. Brough, Lango, & van der Linden 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007) (citing my then-unpublished work). 
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scholars termed bellum offensivum.62 Much of this debate has centered on 
challenging the widely accepted views of Michael Walzer, who had argued 
that, in contrast to the limited justification afforded to preemptive wars of 
self-defense, truly preventive wars, even those fought to impede a ―gather-
ing threat‖ rather than an ―imminent danger,‖ could never under any cir-
cumstances be justified.63  
This blanket proscription now seems to many of us, in the present 
era, yet another example of a stubborn and excessively rigid conceptual 
distinction that simply ―does not answer‖ to the dilemmas of contemporary 
humanitarian and counter-insurgency (counter-terrorist) missions. Instead, 
we might turn out in fact to be extremely reluctant to condemn a preventive 
intervention in a nation‘s sovereignty for the purposes of avoiding or halting 
a massive humanitarian disaster, such as genocide. And, we might grant 
more latitude to such humanitarian-oriented missions than we would allow 
to preventive security interventions undertaken to combat terrorism, espe-
cially in the absence of concrete evidence (rather than speculation) concern-
ing the existence or precise activities of an ongoing criminal conspiracy. 
V. FROM JUS AD PACEM TO JUS IN PACE 
There is a good deal to ―muddle through‖ in all this, involving both 
entry into, behavior during, and perhaps just as importantly, wrapping up 
and walking away from such inherently messy, and morally (not to mention 
legally) vague military operations. It is nevertheless important to try to do a 
better job, since IW conflicts, for the foreseeable future, constitute the prin-
cipal kinds of conflicts we will ask our military forces to undertake on our 
behalf.64  
First, the set of distinctions that both international law and these re-
cent U.N.-sponsored studies presuppose seem to suggest that the use of 
military force in response to, say, a terrorist attack is both more clearly de-
  
 62 See Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan 
Institutional Proposal, 18 ETHICS & INT‘L AFF. 1, 4 n.8 (2004) (―The humanitarian law of 
war can be seen as an imperfect institutionalization of some of the most important jus in 
bello principles of just war theory. However, given the distinctive risks of the preventive use 
of force, special institutional arrangements are required for responsible decisions to use force 
preventively, over and above better compliance with rules of humane warfare that are de-
signed to apply to all uses of force.‖); David Luban, Just War and Human Rights, 9 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 160, 173 (1980) (―In such circumstances a conception of jus ad bellum like the one 
embodied in the UN definition fails to address the moral reality of war. It reflects a theory 
that speaks to the realities of a bygone era.‖). 
 63 See Michael Walzer, The Crime of Aggressive War, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
635, 640 (2007) (―It seems to me that prevention is still wrong; ordinary brutality is not a just 
occasion for military attack.‖). 
 64 See generally George R. Lucas, Jr., ―This Is Not Your Father’s War‖ –Confronting the 
Moral Challenges of ―Unconventional‖ War, 3 J. NAT‘L SEC. L. & POL‘Y 329 (2009). 
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fined and legitimated, as well as utterly distinct from, a decision to use mili-
tary force to halt a humanitarian disaster.65 That may seem initially to be a 
straightforward demarcation. But after the ruling government and the terror-
ists themselves have been routed, it is less clear what governs the behavior 
of the intervening forces in rebuilding and restoring the rule of law in the 
nation it has invaded. The latter involves counterinsurgency in the form of 
constabulary and security work, but also reconstruction and humanitarian 
relief. And, in any case, if a nation is ―clearly justified‖ in intervening in 
another to rout terrorists who have attacked its soil, does it not have a simi-
lar right to prevent such attacks, or the growth of such criminal conspiracies 
elsewhere as well—as the U.N. ―High Level Panel‖ report on international 
security in 2005 strongly suggests?  
Given all these uncertainties and contingencies, as well as the un-
derlying similarities of the types of activities in which invading forces must 
finally engage in order to impose a workable economic and political solu-
tion to them, it seems unwise in the extreme to draw sharp distinctions stub-
bornly between them. Nor should we fail to acknowledge the underlying 
challenge that all of these ―irregular‖ and unconventional military opera-
tions pose for our understanding of existing international law and institu-
tions.  
In his essay, Why Serve the State?, Martin L. Cook offers a telling 
historical synopsis of the current paradox of professional military ethics and 
military services. Cook links all the foregoing questions to the underlying 
tension between moral claims that are universal in scope on one hand, such 
as the respect for non-combatant immunity, and the protection of basic hu-
man rights, and the particular claims and responsibilities laid upon military 
personnel as employees or ―servants‖ of individual nation-states.66 They 
have as both moral agents generally, and especially as professional military 
personnel armed with deadly force, to protect and not harm the innocent, 
and to provide benevolent quarter to those in crisis.67 Those universal moral 
claims and duties arising from the profession of arms, however, often come 
into tension with the duties of military personnel as servants of the state to 
carry out or defend the policies (as well as the citizens and the borders) of 
the particular state in which they happen to reside.68 The resulting paradox 
of military professionalism that he describes drives many of the dilemmas 
we confront in humanitarian operations and other forms of IW, and them-
  
 65 U.N. Secretary-General, Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit: Note by 
the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 5–11, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
 66 See generally, MARTIN L. COOK, THE MORAL WARRIOR 39–53 (2004). 
 67 Id. at 51. 
 68 Id. These arguments originally appeared in the author‘s 1994 Reiff Lecture at the U.S. 
Air Force Academy: WHY SERVE THE STATE?: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF MILITARY 
OFFICERSHIP. 
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selves are caused by, rather than resolved through reliance upon, interna-
tional law grounded in the Westphalian nation-state paradigm. 
Humanitarian intervention is a particularly pronounced, but by no 
means unique, manifestation of this underlying Westphalian dilemma. 
Troops trained and equipped to defend the nation, consisting of individuals 
who have sworn an oath to risk their lives in that endeavor, are instead dep-
loyed to risk their lives and expend their resources in the defense of other 
nations and their peoples, in a fashion that cannot easily be subsumed under 
the existing U.N. statutes pertaining to ―collective security.‖ Elsewhere, as 
in Afghanistan, hostilities may begin in a straightforward fashion, as the 
military forces of allied nations, under a conventional legal understanding of 
self-defense or collective security, invade that country in pursuit of criminal 
elements and rogue governments that shelter them. They quickly find them-
selves enmeshed in risky, highly fraught, and dangerous situations of 
peacekeeping, stability, security, and humanitarian reconstruction that looks 
for all the world like a COIN response to a local insurgency, or to internal 
political conflicts that are really none of the occupying coalition‘s business. 
On the other hand, if the insurgency or internal political rivalries and insta-
bilities themselves constitute a regrettable result of having allowed a prob-
lem like Afghanistan or Rwanda to fester too long in the past, would it not 
be in some sense obligatory, as well as permissible, to try to ―head off‖ such 
situations before they reach a tragic climax in the present? 
For these reasons, I have linked both counter-terrorism and law en-
forcement with humanitarian intervention in the list of conditions I have 
compiled in Table One (appendix) from some two decades of wrestling with 
these questions and problems. In particular, I think it crucial to determine 
when we might incur obligations to undertake these missions, as well as the 
legal and moral ―right‖ to do so. Issues of conflict of interest in decision-
making and deployment likewise need to be carefully considered. And final-
ly, guidance concerning the rules of engagement and the constraints on use 
of force needs to be radically re-thought in light of those obligations and 
underlying intentions. This is what the provisions summarized in Table 
One,69 and those comprising the summary of R2P, attempt to accomplish.70 
  
 69 See Appendix, below. 
 70 It bears mention that Martin Cook now questions the very intelligibility, as well as the 
practical feasibility, of attempting to do this. See Martin Cook, Accountability for Interna-
tional Intervention/Protection Activities, 29 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS 2 (2010). Alongside 
serious practical problems of poor performance and lack of accountability of peace-keeping 
forces themselves, he raises serious conceptual objections. If R2P, for example, constitutes 
an ―imperfect duty‖ in the sense described above, then it is in principle impossible to legis-
late, because we cannot intelligibly compel nations to ―do good works‖ for unspecified oth-
ers. Id. This involves thinking clearly not only about ―sovereignty‖ per se, but also about the 
purpose and function of nations themselves as guarantors of security and common life for 
their citizens. Using their militaries for benevolent but risky purposes in other, failing states 
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When comparing the two sets of proposals, however, there are some 
revealing differences. For example, there is no restriction in the diplomatic 
proposals baring blatant conflicts of interest, such as might tempt powerful 
nations from exploiting the difficulties of their neighbors in order to cloak a 
naked grab for territory or resources in the guise of a ―humanitarian mis-
sion‖ of liberation or salvation.71 More disconcerting is the relative lack of 
detailed emphasis72 in the diplomats‘ discussion of the following points: 
(1) substantive reflections on how the intervening military forces, the 
combatants, should conduct themselves during the intervention (Table I, 
7); and  
(2) what has recently come to be called jus post bellum: namely, how and 
when the intervening military forces ought to declare their work com-
pleted, and withdraw (Table I, 3 (ii)).
73
  
The first consideration is the traditional realm of jus in bello, the 
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). As with the discussion of conventional jus 
ad bellum above, the question is in large part whether or not our customary 
(and somewhat inchoate) understanding of LOAC in its conventional sense 
will cover the demands of what I have termed jus in pace. It is precisely this 
matter that the U.S. Army COIN field manual addresses, precisely because 
we cannot really rely on past practice and understanding as adequate guid-
ance for these circumstances.74 
  
may constitute a violation of the tacit underlying agreement that any nation has with its own 
military personnel, and it would be beyond the legal reach of the U.N. or the international 
community to override this contractual arrangement by compelling any nation to utilize its 
military in this fashion. 
 71 See Appendix, Table I, Provision 3(i). 
 72 The ICISS report offers some, but not a great deal, of guidance regarding humanitarian 
operations, and none regarding any other features of IW. It holds principally that such opera-
tions must proceed on the basis of ―clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all 
times; and resources to match‖ and entail what the report terms a ―common military ap-
proach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and unequivocal communications 
and chain of command.‖ It cautions that such operations require acceptance by the interven-
ing forces of ―limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the 
objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state.‖ To this end, the report urges 
the adoption by intervening militaries of ―rules of engagement which fit the operational 
concept; are precise; reflect the principle of proportionality; and involve total adherence to 
international humanitarian law,‖ and, in particular, that such forces accept ―that force protec-
tion cannot become the principal objective‖ of the humanitarian mission. ICISS, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: PRINCIPLES FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION ¶ 4(a–d) (Dec. 2001), 
available at http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp. 
 73 Appendix, Table I. 
 74 U.S. ARMY & MARINE CORPS, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL3-25 (2007). This is 
not to argue that these circumstances are new or unprecedented. President George Washing-
ton offered advice on just these points to Col. Benedict Arnold, during what American histo-
rian, Joseph J. Ellis, termed ―America‘s first preemptive war‖ against Canada in 1775. Much 
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Like conventional jus in bello, jus in pace stresses the morality of 
means. Consider the final entry on permissible strategy, tactics, weapons 
systems, and conduct, in Table 1.75 Alongside conventional jus in bello con-
straints, like noncombatant immunity (discrimination) and proportionality, 
these jus in pace guidelines also address issues specific to COIN and huma-
nitarian interventions, such as the tactic of ―force protection.‖76 Force pro-
tection in normal instances is taking reasonable precautions to insure the 
safety and security of one‘s own military forces, ranging from posting sen-
tries and establishing checkpoints, to avoiding the temptation to commit 
troops to domestic altercations or disturbances whose nature and cause are 
unclear.77 Owing to the absence of national self-interest, however, NATO 
troops were famously told by their commanding officers in Kosovo, as in 
Haiti, that the political purposes of the intervention were ―not worth the loss 
of a single one of your lives.‖78 In Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia, this lack of 
the intervening military‘s identification with the military mission resulted in 
a transition from normal force protection to the extreme of ―radical‖ force 
protection, in which intervening troops refused, or were even ordered not to 
provide, elementary protection or security to victimized populations (e.g., as 
in the case of Belgian Army Captain Luc Lemaire at the Don Bosco school 
compound in Rwanda, or the complaint of U.S. Army captain Lawrence 
Rockwood concerning the welfare of Haitian political prisoners).79 In other 
instances, intervening NATO troops were initially ordered to refrain from 
attempting to interdict indigenous criminals, such as Radovan Karadžić and 
  
of his advice, like that of General Petraeus in the U.S. Army‘s current COIN manual, con-
cerns showing respect to the inhabitants of occupied territories, whose affections we wanted 
at least not to alienate, treating POWs well, avoiding the commission of atrocities or acts of 
wanton cruelty and punishing its own individual members for any perceived infractions of 
these basic principles by the intervening army, and finally, showing ―cultural awareness‖ and 
sensitivity, especially in matters of religion. See Brian O‘Malley, Lessons on Iraq From a 
Founding Father, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2008, at A-15. Arnold‘s troops, the article avers, 
won the affections of Canadians initially, but squandered their good will through blatant and 
repeated violations of Washington‘s edicts. 
 75 Appendix, Table I. 
 76 Id. at 7(v). 
 77 Ronald Rokosz & Charles Hash, Changing the Mindset Army Antiterrorism Force Pro-
tection, JOINT FORCES Q., Autumn/Winter 1997–98, at 112. 
 78 George R. Lucas, Jr., New Rules for New Wars: Just War Doctrine for Irregular War 
(2006), http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/4/1/6/0/3/pages41 
6035/p416035-1.php. 
 79 In Rwanda, this was the case for Belgian Army Captain Luc Lemaire at the Don Bosco 
school compound, and U.S. Army Captain Lawrence Rockwood in Haiti concerning the 
welfare of Haitian political prisoners. Both cases are described in CASE STUDIES IN ETHICS 
AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION, EDS. GEORGE R. LUCAS, JR. AND W. R. RUBEL (3d ed., New 
York: Pearson, 2007). 
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Gen. Ratko Mladić, the so-called ―Butchers of Srebrenicia,‖ in Bosnia, lest 
in doing so they generate more conflict and imperil their own welfare.80  
While no soldier generally wishes to die in war and competent 
commanders always do everything they can to avoid ―taking casualties,‖ the 
entire concept of risk and risk-aversion are very different in COIN than in 
conventional war. It is easier to bomb from on high than at lower, more 
discriminate, but also more risky altitudes. Likewise, it is easier to bomb, 
shell, or call in a missile attack, than to order a ground force to invade a 
local village, house-to-house. In conventional war, as Walzer demonstrates, 
there is no obligation that compels troops to undertake the riskier tactic oth-
er than the legal requirement to avoid intentional criminal negligence in the 
use to deadly force.81 As Walzer‘s numerous cases on this topic indicate, 
compliance with that vague legal restriction is often a matter of considerable 
variance in judgment.82 By contrast, in COIN operations, it is imperative 
that occupation security forces incur the greater risk, in order to avoid even 
the appearance, let alone the actual prospect, of harming those they have 
intervened to protect.83 
The other peculiarity of interventions, as with police work, is what 
can and should be done with POWs who turn out to be wanted criminals, or 
who are at least subject to indictment under international law. Unlike the 
diplomatic provisions of R2P, the provisions of Table I, Section 7 above 
compel invading forces to arrest those (such as Milosovek, Karadžić, 
Mladić or, for that matter, Saddam Hussein) charged with, or suspected of 
crimes against international law, and compel them to turn over such sus-
pected criminals to appropriate international authorities, such as the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, rather than to summarily try them in understandably 
hypersensitive and highly biased local venues. 
VI. FROM JUS IN PACE TO JUS POST BELLUM:  
        HOW LONG TO STAY AND WHEN TO ―GO HOME‖ 
Neither the academic nor the diplomatic discussions of proposed 
―new rules‖ for IW explicitly address so-called jus post bellum. Yet this, as 
I mentioned, is precisely what COIN and humanitarian interventions pri-
marily are, or else what they quickly, and almost exclusively become. Thus, 
any attempt to encompass ―new rules‖ for IW conflicts must surely take 
account of this recent development in just war theory. Just war doctrine 
  
 80 Id. 
 81 Walzer, supra note 19, at 305. 
 82 Id. at 304–324. 
 83 Kevin Parker, Worth the Risk: Balancing Force Protection to Achieve Effective COIN 
Results, THE WRIGHT STUFF (Feb 3, 2011), http://www.au.af.mil/au/aunews/archive/2011/ 
0603/0603Articles/MajParkerOnCOIN.pdf. 
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must henceforth be understood, on this new account, to consist of three (ra-
ther than merely two) parts, each corresponding to war‘s beginning, prose-
cution, and end: jus ad bellum, the justification of entering into war, jus in 
bello, the military conduct of adversaries during war, and jus post bellum, 
the obligations of war‘s victors to its victims to establish a just and lasting 
peace, sufficient to prevent the onset of future conflict. Jus post bellum is 
not merely an afterthought, but a preeminent and overriding obligation laid 
upon belligerents in the interest of justice. No war can be termed ―just,‖ and 
no belligerents exonerated for their participation in it, in which there is not, 
from the outset, a manifest intent (revealed in policy and practice) to ensure 
a stable peace that provides for both long-term security and the protection of 
basic human rights in that war‘s aftermath. This is part and parcel of the full 
import of ―right intention‖ in classical jus ad bellum.84  
In particular, the three dimensions of just war discourse are not 
neatly separable, and must not be compartmentalized.85 One cannot discuss 
jus ad bellum in abstraction, distinct from the expectation that combatants, 
proposing to defend or enforce justice, must employ only just means in the 
realization of just ends (jus in bello). This intention must precede, and tho-
roughly infuse combat, even as the intention to restore peace with justice 
and to repair a society‘s ability to sustain and protect its citizens (jus post 
bellum) must infuse both deliberations about war and the subsequent con-
duct of it. War‘s onset, its conduct, and its aftermath flow seamlessly to-
gether, and policymakers, as well as combatants, are drawn together into a 
web of moral responsibility for war‘s advent and outcome. These new in-
sights prove especially pertinent to the conduct of irregular war.  
Regarding rules of engagement during jus post bellum, in the after-
math of more conventional hostilities undertaken for otherwise morally-
justifiable ends, we might reasonably expect (and a minimally-just state 
itself should consistently demand) that its own military forces commit 
themselves to respecting the most basic elemental rights of noncombatants 
in the enemy state. This commitment must be sustained through education 
and training leading up to deployment, and reinforced consistently during 
the period of deployment. This is especially important when, as in humani-
tarian interventions or regime change, the opposing state and its rank-and-
  
 84 See Brian Orend, Just War Theory and the Ethics of War and Peace, in THE ASHGATE 
RESEARCH COMPANION TO ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 115, 117 (Patrick Hayden 
ed., 2009); see also BRIAN OREND, MICHAEL WALZER ON WAR AND JUSTICE, 94 (2000) (pre-
senting a discussion of ―right intention‖ in Walzer‘s theory of jus ad bellum); see also BRIAN 
OREND, WAR AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE 190 (2000) (discussing 
―right intention‖ from a Kantian point of view). 
 85 See BRIAN OREND, THE MORALITY OF WAR 31 (2006) (presenting the history of just war 
theory and examining its multiple dimensions as being logically and conceptually distinct, 
but inextricably intertwined). 
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file citizens do not themselves constitute ―the enemy‖ in any meaningful 
sense.  
I have argued myself that, far from constituting a lofty or unrealisti-
cally high standard, this principle is simply a demand for consistency of 
purpose.86 Commitment to noncombatant immunity, as well as to restraint, 
proportionality, and the economy of force, are not abstract ideals, let alone 
reducible to uncomprehending or cynical compliance with the requirements 
of international law. Instead, adherence to such principles essentially de-
fines the intervening state or coalition‘s commitment to minimal justice in 
the first place, from which it derives its authority to wield the sword in de-
fense of justice. By marked contrast, it is not the putative justice of their 
cause, but the sustained and intentional injustice of their means, that identi-
fies and morally de-legitimates the tactics of both terrorists and so-called 
―rogue states.‖ 
It is this jus in pace and jus post bellum asymmetry in behavior and 
intentionality that, finally, allows us to discriminate with confidence be-
tween a warrior and a murderer, as well as between legitimate acts of war, 
and criminal activities. And it is this principle that must be taught, empha-
sized, and reinforced with unmistakable clarity in the education and training 
of legitimate military forces.87 This demonstrates, in turn, that the historical 
and culturally bound dimensions of both law and tradition regarding con-
ventional war and traditional just war doctrine are currently being pushed to 
their limits. This is especially noteworthy as we wrestle with the structure 
and future of international institutions like the U.N., or debate the meaning 
of an ―international community‖ as a legitimate form of authority, and won-
der together in good faith about the future reforms needed in international 
law to authorize, and even obligate the use of force in the interests of jus-





Provisions for Jus ad Pacem and Jus in Pace 
(Humanitarian and Counterterrorist Interventions) 
 
  
 86 See Lucas, The Reluctant Interventionist: The Critique of Realism and the Resurgence 
of Morality in Foreign Policy, supra note 4; Lucas, From Jus ad bellum to Jus ad pacem, 
supra note 4. 
 87 See EMPOWERING OUR MILITARY CONSCIENCE, supra note 38 (Ed. Roger Wertheimer; 
presenting a collection of works on the education of just war theory and ethics for military 
personnel). 
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1. (A) “Humanitarian intervention is justified whenever a nation-state’s 
behavior results in grave and massive violations of human rights, or 
poses an imminent threat of grave harm to other nations and peoples.” 
 
(i) intervention is justified when these behaviors result in grave threats to 
the peace and security of other states and other peoples; and  
 
(ii) intervention need not be restricted to such cases, but may be justified 
when the threats to human rights are wholly contained within the borders of 
the state in question.  
 
(B) States may use military force in the face of threats of war, or im-
pending terrorist actions, or preparations by states or non-state actors 
actively engaged in doing, or imminently threatening, grave harm to 
other nations and peoples, whenever: 
 
(i) there is a manifest intent on the part of such parties to injure; and 
 
(ii) there is a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive 
danger; and 
 
(iii) both of the foregoing occur in a situation in which waiting, or doing 
anything other than deploying military force preemptively, greatly magni-
fies the risk. 
 
2. (A) “Sovereignty may be overridden whenever the protection of the 
rights of that states’ own citizens can be assured only from the outside.” 
 
(i) sovereignty may be overridden whenever the behavior of the state in 
question, even within its own territory, threatens the existence of elementary 
human rights abroad; and 
 
(ii) sovereignty may be overridden even when there is no threat to human 
rights outside the borders of the state in question, providing the threat to that 
state‘s own citizens are real and immediate.  
 
(B) “The decision to override sovereignty and intervene must finally be 
subject to review and approval by an appropriate collective interna-
tional body.” 
 
(i)The decision to intervene, whether to protect human rights or enforce 
international law, ought never to be undertaken unilaterally; however 
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(ii) a unilateral agent of intervention may be authorized by an appropriate 
international tribunal; and also 
 
(iii) a regional security organization may be authorized by an appropriate 
international tribunal to undertake a military intervention for humanitarian 
or counterterrorist purpose; and 
 
(iv) in the absence of prior approval, the burden of proof falls upon the in-
tervening power to demonstrate that it has unilateral license to intervene, 
based upon prima facie compliance with all of the above. 
 
3. The intention in using force must be restricted without exception 
either to purely humanitarian concerns, such as the restoration of law 
and order in the face of natural disaster, or to the protection of the 
rights and liberties of vulnerable peoples (as defined in the United Na-
tions Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), or to 
halt or prevent violations of international law by nations or non-state 
actors that pose a clear and imminent threat of grave harm to other 
nations or peoples.  
 
(i) intervening nations and their militaries should possess no financial, polit-
ical or material interests in the outcome of the intervention, other than 
achieving the publicly proclaimed humanitarian ends, enforcing internation-
al law, or averting the risk of grave and substantial harm to other nations 
and peoples; and 
 
(ii) the intervening nation or nations must establish a set of conditions under 
which the need for intervention will have been satisfied, together with a 
reasonable timetable for achieving their humanitarian ends or eliminating 
the perceived threat. 
 
4. Military intervention may be resorted to for humanitarian purposes, 
or to avert the risk of terrorism or enforce vital provisions of interna-
tional law, only when all other options have been exhausted. 
 
(i) this condition is deemed to have been met when reasonable nonviolent 
efforts have been unsuccessful and there is no indication that future attempts 
will fare any better. 
 
5. Military force may be utilized for humanitarian purposes, , or to 
avert the risk of terrorism or enforce vital provisions of international 
law, only when there is a reasonable likelihood that the application of 
force will meet with success in averting a humanitarian tragedy. 
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(i) a resort to military force may not be invoked when there is a real proba-
bility that the use of such force will prove ineffective, or may actually wor-
sen the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the crisis; and  
 
(ii) military force may not be employed, either for humanitarian ends or for 
the purposes of counterterrorism and law enforcement, whenever collective, 
public debate and deliberation fail to determine straightforward and feasible 
goals to be achieved by the application of force.  
 
6. The lives, welfare, rights and liberties to be protected from humani-
tarian disaster or terrorist attacks must bear some reasonable propor-
tion to the risks of harm incurred, and the damage one might reasona-
ble expect to inflict in pursuit of humanitarian ends. 
 
7. Military force used for humanitarian or counterterrorist purposes 
may never encompass the use of strategy, tactics, weapons systems or 
battlefield conduct that are themselves recognized as illegal or immoral.  
 
(i) captured belligerents must be treated as prisoners of war according to 
established international conventions, and may not be mistreated or subject 
to trial or sentence by the intervening forces; and 
 
(ii) prisoners of war accused of humanitarian crimes and abuses, or of en-
gaging actively in planning for a doing grave and indiscriminate harm to 
other nations and peoples, may be bound over for trial by an appropriate 
international tribunal; and 
 
(iii) civilian noncombatants must never be deliberately targeted during a 
humanitarian or counterterrorist military operation; and 
 
(iv) military necessity during humanitarian or counterterrorist operations 
can never excuse the use of weapons, or pursuit of battlefield tactics, al-
ready proscribed as illegal under established international treaties and con-
ventional law of armed combat; and 
 
(v) finally, military necessity during humanitarian or counterterrorist opera-
tions cannot excuse tactics or policies, such as ―force protection,‖ that kno-
wingly, deliberately, and disproportionately reallocate risk of harm from the 
peace-keeping forces and belligerents to non-combatants. 
 
*************************************************************
*******************  
 
